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IN THE SUPREME C THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMIE LYNN GREENWOOD, 
De f end a.n I R e sp o n d e n t 
Case N o . 20II 0 063 2 SC 
... STATEMENT .Of .JURISDICTION 
Having granted the State's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, 
involving foui I: i rsL-deyi oe i t J uim 'tJ, IJIIJI i 'in IM,": JUJ iiidii'i i • *• 11 
over the instant appeal pursuant to article VI11, § 3, of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah Code Ann. ,< 3A J in^ iijii \\\\ , 
• STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1 Wl letl lei: tl le t:i :i a] coi n: t abused :i ts ::l:i screti on by grai itii ig 
Defendant's motion to waive trial by jury. 
Standai d ot Review T h * ' I i i . i I <'« >n it I s app] icatd c -3 I : f tl i< B 
lega 1 concept of waiver of trial by jury to a given set of facts 
constitutes a mixed question oi iacL ana law, state v. Lo\ in, .lum, 
UT 50, 11 21 & n.20, 144 P.3d IUJU ^citing State v. Penaf 869 P.2d 
932, 938 (Utah 1994) and Searle v, Milburn Irrig. Co., 2001, M"i" In, 
1 ' reviewing mixed questions of fact and 
law, "the considerations that favor a more-deferential standard of 
review and those that favor a less-deferential standard of review 
compete for dominance, and the amount of deference that results 
will vary according to the nature of the legal concept at issue." 
Id.; see also State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^ 27-28, 137 P.3d 787. 
See Argument I.A. below for a detailed discussion of the standard 
of review in the instant case. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations, the interpretation of which is determinative, are 
set out verbatim with the appropriate citation in the body and 
arguments of the instant Brief of Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the State's interlocutory appeal from the 
trial court's order granting Defendant's motion to waive trial by 
jury. As such, it involves critical questions about the 
circumstances that are so compelling as to provide an exception to 
the State's lack of consent to waiver and its insistence to trial 
by jury. 
Defendant was charged with two counts of Rape and two counts 
of Forcible Sodomy, all of which are first-degree felonies, in 
addition to one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second-degree 
2 
fel ony At TK >rciinq to the charges, Defendant allegedly had a sexual 
relationship with her son/s teenage friend. Defendant pleaded not 
qui 1 1 7 I ni , i I I I I in' f'liarqes . 
Prior to trial, the court held a preliminary hearing where the 
all eged v/ :i c t : i: n: i test: f :i eel Ii I a> :ic:I:l t::i : n t l le coi ii : t: he I d a hearing on 
Defendant' s 4:1 2 Motion, :i i I which Defendant requested the trial 
cour'_ ;.,... a in id 11( t: :i a ] # e * :i dei ice c f tl i.e a ] ] ege :i ? d ctd i n/ 
record of prior sexual misconduct. At trial, Defendant moved the 
court for a waiver of her right to 1 L I JL II ' |ui , . 'Hi'1 I i i-il II I 
granted the motion after consideration of the particular 
circumstances of Defendant's case. 
The State sought interlocutory appeal of the trial court's 
order; which this Court granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are recited jn . ;A.. nguL m^3t favorable to tl le ti ial 
c o u r t ' S findings. See State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 
1996) ("In reviewing the trial court's ruling; we recite tl le facts 
i ' - -; L must favorable to the trial court's findings.") 
(ciirn-g Sta:.- •-. ":;ia# 8r? P ?i °12, ?3<5 'U^'b 1994) and State v. 
Ram, i rezf 8] ' i I 2 1 7 7 3 , ; ' •,•:;:,,. 
3 
The Five Felony Charges: 
1. In March 2010, the State charged Defendant with the 
following: two counts of Rape, both first-degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402; two counts of Forcible 
Sodomy, both first-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-403(2); and one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (R. 1-4) . 
2. According to the charging document, Defendant had a 
sexual relationship with her son's teenage friend, A.B. (R. 3-4). 
The Preliminary Hearing: 
3. The parties appeared before the district court for a 
preliminary hearing on April 7, 2010, during which A.B. testified 
(R. 16).1 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court bound 
Defendant over on all counts to which Defendant pleaded not guilty 
(Id.) . 
The 412 Motion: 
4. On May 13, 2 010, Defendant, pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Evidence 412(b)(2)(A), moved the trial court to admit evidence of 
the victim's juvenile record of prior sexual misconduct,2 arguing 
that the relationship was consensual in nature and that Defendant, 
JNo transcript of the preliminary hearing was requested or 
produced on appeal. 
defendant alleged that A.B.'s juvenile record included a sex 
abuse charge (R. 25). 
4 
i iiiMji, j Lhreatened and intimidated by A.B. into the sexual 
conduct. (P 74-26). Defendant further argued that gi,( en the 
consensual .t .1 1 t e : f t .1 t.e relationship, the charges would be 
significantly different (R. 2 5 ) . 
TI: le pi: osecu;t:i : 1 1 ardent! y opposed the Motion, argi i:i ng that 
A.B.'s alleged sexual behavior was inadrrn ssible under Rule 412 of 
the Utah R.11] e, 3 o i: Ev idenee (I ! 2 7 3 7) 
6. T'l » 1 t i. :il court deferred rulinq on the 412 Motion unt il 
counsel pro\~..;eci '.he court with lln' j uv^ii j [ t; I.IHII/I j^'ord^ Ml" !P»). 
7. On June 17, 2010, counsel appeared before the district 
court and presented oral argument on the 1 /lot" ion (I1 ' ' '" Th-r* 
trj_aj_ c o u r t thereafter determined that Defendant was prohibited 
from utilizing A.B.'s juvenile court records at tri:.., ) 
The Mo t" 1 on ! 1 » Wa i ">•>" Ti • i a 1 hy ' 111 jr: 
8. On August 4, /MJHJ, t h e p a r t i e s appea red f o r a j u r y t r i a l , 
w h e r e D e f e n d a 1 11, a f t: e 1: c a 1 e f 1 :i ] c o 1 1 s 2 d e r a t :i o 1 1, 1:1: 1. D "\ ? e d t: I: 1 e t r :i a ] c o u r t 
to waive her right to a jury tri al (R. 139:3-4) . 
9 . T1 1 e r e a s o 1 1 s f o 1: I) e f e n d a 1 11 s i 1 a :i "1i; e :i : :i 1: 1 c ] 1 1 d e d 1 (a) 11 1 e 
seriousness of the charges, the crucial issue of consent, and the 
r e 1 a t i v e 1 y f :i 1 1. e 1 i n e b e t w e e 1 1 11: 1 e :i s s i 1 e • :> f c o 1 :i s e 1 11 :i 1 1 t: 1 1 e i n s t a 1 11 
case; (j^ ) that, given the issue of consent, there are lesser 
3No transcript of the 412 Motion hearing was requested or 
produced on appeal. 
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included offenses requiring a weighing of factors more objectively 
analyzed by a court; and (c) the "high profile" publicity and 
nature of the allegations in the case (R. 139:4-6).4 
10. The prosecution objected pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 17 (c), arguing that it did not consent to the 
waiver (R. 139:7-8). In addition, the prosecution contended that 
Defendant's concerns could be addressed through the voir dire and 
jury instruction process (R. 139:8). In so arguing, the 
prosecution essentially acknowledged the merits of the lesser 
included offenses, and that the case had drawn the publicity stated 
by Defendant (R. 139:7-10). 
The Trial Court's Initial Ruling: 
11. At the outset, the trial court acknowledged the relevant 
case law underlying the general rule that a defendant cannot waive 
a jury trial without the approval of the court and consent of the 
prosecution (R. 139:10-11). However, the court expressed concern 
about the "tremendous control" placed in the hands of the 
prosecution to determine whether the case will be tried by the jury 
or the court (R. 139:11:2-16). 
12. Prior to its ruling, the trial court indicated that it 
"would prefer the jury making the decision [as trier of fact] 
4A true and correct copy of the transcript of the hearing held 
on August 4, 2010, R. 139, is attached to this Brief as Addendum A. 
6 
rather than the Court", and, in addition, making sure that 
Defendant understood the difference between a jury and bench trial 
(R. 139:11-12) .5 
13. At the outset of its ruling, the trial court confirmed 
its understanding of Rule 17(c) and the applicable case law (R. 
139:13:18-21). However, the court stated that it did not believe 
a defendant is prevented in every case from waiving his or her 
right to a jury trial (R. 139:13:21-23). The trial court stated: 
The Court believes that upon a proper showing, that 
the defendant should be able to waive her right to 
a jury trial, that to allow the State in every case 
to defeat that would place a tremendous burden on 
the defendant that if a showing can be made, that 
there is a proper reason why the case should be 
tried to the Court rather than to the jury. It 
appears to the court that there would be an 
implication of due process rights to the defendant 
if the Court were to deny that simply because the 
State refuses to give its consent to the waiver. 
(R. 139:13-14). 
14. The court granted the motion to waive the jury trial, 
stating that it was "satisfied in this case because of the nature 
of the allegations and the prior publicity along with the . . . 
very fine line between the offenses charged and the lesser included 
offenses." (R. 139:10-14). In light of the particular 
5The trial court went so far as to have trial counsel take a 
moment with Defendant to make sure she understood the difference 
between a bench trial with one trier of fact as opposed to a jury 
trial with eight triers of fact (R. 139:11-13). 
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circumstances of this case, the court stated that "it would be a 
denial of Ms. Greenwood's due process rights to force her to be 
tried by a jury." (R. 139:15-17). 
The Trial Court's Further Consideration of the Waiver Matter: 
15. After granting the prosecution's recfuest for a recess to 
prepare a written objection, the prosecution filed its Objection to 
Waiver of a Jury Trial, and Memorandum in Support (R. 114-17) . 
16. In its written Objection, the prosecution argued that 
both Rule 17(c) and binding case law of this Court require the 
prosecution's consent for a waiver and as such the trial court 
should proceed with the scheduled jury trial (Id.) . 
17. After additional oral argument, the trial court cited the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Singer v. United States, 
where the Court recognized there might be circumstances where a 
defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so 
compelling that the government's insistence on trial by jury would 
result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial (R. 
139:23-24). 
18. The trial court further stated: 
I think the Supreme Court in Singer leaves 
open, as an exception to that general rule which 
the Court recognizes that that is the general rule, 
but I think, based on what has been presented, the 
reasons why the defendant wants to waive a jury in 
this case, because of the nature of the 
allegations, because of the publicity, because of 
8 
the lesser included offenses that the cumulative 
impact of those facts seem, to this Court, to 
require that the Court grant the motion, that the 
State cannot, in every case, prevent the 
defendant's waiver, and it's in the unusual case 
that the State -- only in the unusual case is there 
a waiver of the right would be granted, and I think 
this is the unusual case. 
(R. 139:24:8-22) . 
19. The prosecution informed the court of its intent to file 
an interlocutory appeal (R. 139:25:5-8). 
The Trial Court's Written Findings and Order: 
20. At the prosecution's request, the court directed 
Defendant's trial counsel to prepare written findings and an order 
on the motion (R. 139:30:4-10). 
21. The trial court signed its Decision on Defendant's Motion 
to Waive Trial by Jury on August 4, 2 010, which was entered that 
same day (R. 106-07).6 
The State's Interlocutory Appeal: 
22. That same day, the State petitioned this Court for 
permission to appeal the interlocutory order, accompanied by a 
petition for emergency stay -- both of which were granted (R. 121) . 
A true and correct copy of the trial court's Decision on 
Defendant's Motion to Waive Trial by Jury, R. 106-07, is attached to 
this Brief as Addendum B. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting 
Defendant's motion for waiver of trial by jury. 
A. For purposes of review, the trial court's waiver of 
jury trial determination constitutes a mixed question of fact 
and law due to the trial court's application of the legal 
concept of waiver to the fact scenario presented in the 
instant case. The test employed for determining the standard 
of review for mixed questions demonstrates that deference 
should be granted to the trial court when analyzing a request 
for waiver of jury trial. 
B. The trial court, based on the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case, acted within its discretion by 
granting the waiver of trial by jury. In light of the United 
States Supreme Court's statement in Singer, the prosecution's 
consent does not appear to be an inflexible condition 
precedent to trial before a judge alone. Rather, one may 
conclude that Singer suggests an exception to the general rule 
when "passion, prejudice or public feelings" would deny an 
accused a fair and impartial trial. 
The trial court acted within its discretion in granting 
Defendant's motion to waive the jury trial inasmuch as the 
decision was based on a thoughtful consideration of the 
10 
particular facts and circumstances of the case and pursuant to 
binding case law that, at the very least, provides an 
exception to the general rule of waiver of trial by jury. 
C. The State failed to marshal the evidence supporting 
the challenged findings. Instead of marshaling the evidence, 
the State challenged only the trial court's legal ruling of 
waiver -- the same argument presented to the trial court. The 
State made no effort to challenge the facts or circumstances 
underlying the trial court's determination that a waiver of 
the trial by jury was appropriate. 
If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate 
court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis 
alone. Moreover, the appellate court assumes that the 
evidence supports the trial court's findings. 
D. The State failed to provide this court with an 
adequate record of the predicated error. When a party 
predicates error to this Court, it has the duty and 
responsibility of supporting such allegation with an adequate 
record. Without an adequate record, this Court simply cannot 
rule on a question which depends for its existence upon 
alleged facts unsupported by the record. 
Because the transcripts of the preliminary hearing and 
hearing on Defendant's 412 Motion are not part of the record -
11 
the record is silent concerning matters critical to the trial 
court findings, which, in turn, served as a basis for granting 
Defendant's waiver of a trial by jury. These critical matters 
included the relatively fine line between the issue of consent 
in the instant case, and that, given the issue of consent, 
there are lesser included offenses requiring a weighing of 
factors to be analyzed by a court. As such, the State failed 
to provide this Court with a complete record of all the 
evidence that was before the trial court that is relevant to 
the alleged error. Because the State failed to provide an 
adequate record, this Court presumes the correctness of the 
proceedings below. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR WAIVER OF TRIAL BY 
JURY. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 (c) dictates that u [a]11 
felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waived a 
jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent 
of the prosecution.'' Utah R. Crim. P. 17(c).7 Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 23(a) is the counterpart to Rule 17(c), which 
likewise provides, "If a defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the 
7A true and correct copy of Utah R. Crim P. 17 is attached to 
this Brief as Addendum C. 
12 
trial must be by jury unless: (1) the defendant waives a jury 
trial in writing; (2) the government consents; and (3) the court 
approves." Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a).8 
In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783 (1965),9 
the United States Supreme Court took the opportunity to interpret 
the permissibility of Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. In that case, Singer had been charged in federal 
district court with 30 infractions of the federal mail fraud 
statute. Id. at 25; 85 S.Ct. at 785. On the first day of trial, 
Singer offered in writing to waive a trial by jury solely and 
simply "[f]or the purpose of shortening the trial." Id. Although 
the trial court approved the waiver, the government refused to give 
its consent. Id. Singer was subsequently convicted by a jury on 
2 9 of the 3 0 counts, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Id. 
On appeal, Singer challenged the permissibility of the federal 
rule, arguing that the United States Constitution gives a defendant 
the right to waive a jury trial whenever he believes such waiver 
"to be to his advantage", regardless of whether the government 
8A true and correct copy of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
23(a) is attached as Addendum A to the State's Brief of Appellant. 
9A true and correct copy of Singer v. United States, 3 80 U.S. 24, 
85 S.Ct. 783 (1965), is attached to this Brief as Addendum D. 
13 
consents and the court approves of the waiver. Id. at 25-2 6; 8 8 
S.Ct. at 785. 
In the course of its analysis, the Court determined that 
"there is no federally recognized right to a criminal trial before 
a judge sitting alone, but a defendant can . . . in some instances 
waive his right to a trial by jury." Id. at 34; 88 S.Ct. at 790. 
According to the Court, "[t]he ability to waive a constitutional 
right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon 
the opposite of that right" and ''although a defendant can under 
some circumstances waive his constitutional right to a public 
trial, he has no absolute right to compel a private trial . . . ." 
Id. at 34-35; 88 S.Ct. at 790. 
The Court consequently upheld the validity of Rule 23(a), 
determining that there is "no constitutional impediment to 
conditioning a waiver of this right on the consent of the 
prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to 
consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an 
impartial trial by jury -- the very thing that the Constitution 
guarantees him." Id. at 36; 88 S.Ct. at 7 90. The Court then 
limited its ruling by stating the following: 
We need not determine in this case whether there 
might be some circumstances where a defendant's 
reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone 
are so compelling that the Government's insistence 
on trial by jury would result in the denial to a 
14 
defendant of an impartial trial. Petitioner argues 
that there might arise situations where "passion, 
prejudice . . . public feeling" or some other 
factor may render impossible or unlikely an 
impartial trial by jury. However, since petitioner 
gave no reason for wanting to forgo jury trial 
other than to save time, this is not such a case, 
and petitioner does not claim that it is. 
Id. at 37-38; 88 S.Ct. at 791 (footnote omitted). 
In State v. Black, 551 P.2d 518 (Utah 1976), which appears to 
be one of the earliest Utah cases addressing a request for waiver 
of trial by jury, the defendant had moved, at the end of the 
State's case, to waive the jury and be tried by the court. Id. at 
52 0. The trial court refused the request and the defendant 
appealed. Id. This Court held that "[t]here is no constitutional 
right to be tried without a jury. The right guaranteed by the 
Constitution of Utah is to be tried by a jury. This right may be 
waived in some instances." Id. The Court further opined that 
"[c]ertainly the court has a discretion not to dismiss the jury in 
the middle of the trial simply because the defendant may deem it 
advantageous to his cause." Id. 
Since that time, this Court has, for the most part, 
essentially held that "there is no constitutional right to a trial 
by a judge rather than a jury." State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 
772 (Utah 1985) (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 
S.Ct. 783 (1965); State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 12-13 (Utah 1984); 
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State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669 (Utah 1982)). In Robbins, this 
Court's most recent pronouncement, the defendant moved to waive 
trial by jury, which the trial court denied. Id. On appeal, the 
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the rule and statute 
allowing a prosecutor to veto a defendant's waiver of jury trial. 
Id. The defendant claimed that "prejudicial publicity" made it 
impossible for him to receive an impartial jury trial. Id. 
However, the Court did not reach the issue because there was 
"nothing before the Court that even suggests that Robbins was 
denied a fair trial because the case was tried to a jury." Id. 
(citing Davis, 689 P.2d at 13) . 
In this case, the trial court granted Defendant's motion for 
waiver of jury trial over the objection of the prosecutor. In so 
doing, the court confirmed its understanding of Rule 17 (c) and the 
applicable case law, stating that it did not believe a defendant is 
prevented in every case from waiving his or her right to a jury 
trial (R. 139:13:18-23). Citing the Singer decision, the trial 
court stated that this case, in light of the specific grounds 
presented to the court, provided an exception to the general rule 
(R. 139:24:8-22). Those grounds included "the nature of the 
allegations and the prior publicity along with the . . . very fine 
line between the offenses charged and the lesser included 
offenses." (R. 139:10-14). 
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A. The Trial Court's Waiver of Jury Trial 
Determination Constitutes a Mixed Question of 
Fact and Law. 
"It is widely agreed that the primary function of a standard 
of review is to apportion power and, consequently, responsibility 
between trial and appellate courts for determining an issue or a 
class of issues." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted) . Standards of review allocate discretion 
between the trial and appellate courts in a way that takes into 
account the "relative capabilities of each level of the court 
system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the face of 
conflicting evidence, on one hand, and to set binding jurisdiction-
wide policy, on the other." State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 1f 19, 144 
P.3d 1096 (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1266). 
The State claims that the standard of review in the instant 
case is for correction of error. See State's Brief of Appellant, 
p. 2. However, the trial court's application of the legal concept 
of waiver of trial by jury to the particular fact scenario at bar 
presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Virgin, 2006 
UT 29, H 27, 137 P. 3d 787. This application of the general rule of 
law to the particular facts or circumstances of the case is 
necessary to determine if they are so compelling that the 
prosecutor's objection would result in the denial to defendant of 
a fair and impartial trial. See United States v. Singer, 380 U.S. 
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24, 37-38, 85 S. Ct. 783, 791 (1965); see also State v. Robbins, 709 
P.2d 771, 772 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 13 
(Utah 1984)); and State v. Black, 551 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1976) 
(stating that the constitutional right to be tried by a jury "may 
be waived in some instances"). 
The analytical complexity of an appellate court's review is at 
its height when reviewing a trial court's application of a legal 
concept to a given set of facts. See Levin, 2006 UT 50 at f 21. 
When reviewing mixed questions, the resulting amount of deference 
to be provided to the trial court will vary according to the nature 
of the legal concept at issue. Id. (citing State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 
932, 939 (Utah 1994); Searle v. Milburn Irrig. Co., 2006 UT 16, f 
16, 133 P.3d 382). The test employed for determining the standard 
of review for mixed questions considers the following factors: (1) 
the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the 
legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial 
court's application of the legal rule relies on "facts" observed by 
the trial judge that cannot be adequately reflected in the record 
on appeal; and (3) other "policy reasons that weigh for or against 
granting discretion to trial courts." Levin, 2006 UT 50 at % 25 
(citing Virgin, 2006 UT 29 at f 28) . 
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Applying the test to the instant case - the first factor 
weighs in favor of granting discretion10 to the trial court inasmuch 
as the cases presented will be of varying complexity, making it 
difficult to balance and articulate a rule that adequately takes 
into consideration the variations of facts and circumstances that 
arise under each factual scenario. See, e.g., United States v. 
Braunstein, 474 F.Supp. 1, 13 (D.N.J. 1979) (waiver allowed over 
government's objection in case of alleged Medicaid fraud and income 
tax charges); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F.Supp. 247, 249 
(D.R.I. 1976) (waiver of jury trial granted over objection of 
government involving 21 count indictment for Medicare fraud, 
multiple defendants, and intricate rulings of admissibility); 
United States v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (non-
jury trial ordered over the government's objection due to 
substantial danger that the defendant would prejudiced because no 
admonition and exclusions of evidence would erase that substantial 
danger). 
Prior Utah Supreme Court case law addressing waiver of trial by 
jury indicates that discretion has been granted to trial courts when 
performing a waiver analysis. See State v. Black, 551 P.2d 518, 520 
(Utah 1976) (stating that the right to trial by jury "may be waived 
in some instances" and that the trial court has "discretion" not to 
grant the requested waiver in the middle of trial) ; see also State v. 
Studham, 655 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1982) (stating that the record 
reflected "no circumstance that so clearly demonstrates an invasion 
of due process or waiver of rights such as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion" by the trial court). 
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Second, the consideration of a request for waiver of jury 
trial, when properly presented, would require the trial court to 
observe and assess witness demeanor and credibility. Although the 
trial court's credibility determinations in this context may be 
limited in nature -- the court's proximity to the particular facts 
and circumstances of the case weights in favor of granting some 
discretion. 
Finally, policy considerations weigh in favor of granting 
trial courts discretion. Trial courts play an important role in 
this context by ferreting out groundless reasons for requesting a 
waiver of trial by jury. See, e.g., United States v. Caldarazzo, 
444 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 328 
(1971) (request for waiver without consent of government denied 
where the defendant claimed "possible factual complexities" 
involving conspiracy charge). Further, the "novelty of the 
situation" as borne out by the paucity of Utah case law on the 
topic weighs in favor of granting trial courts deference in these 
situations. See Levin, 2006 UT 50 at H 30. 
B. The Trial Court, Based on the Particular Facts 
and Circumstances of the Case, Acted Within 
its Discretion by Granting the Waiver of Trial 
by Jury. 
Defendant moved to waive her right to trial by jury pursuant 
to Rule 17(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 17(c) 
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provides, "All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the 
defendant waived a jury in open court with the approval of the 
court and the consent of the prosecution." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(c) . 
In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783 (1965), 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
We need not determine in this case whether there 
might be some circumstances where a defendant's 
reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone 
are so compelling that the Government's insistence 
on trial by jury would result in the denial to a 
defendant of an impartial trial. Petitioner argues 
that there might arise situations where "passion, 
prejudice . . . public feeling" or some other 
factor may render impossible or unlikely an 
impartial trial by jury. However, since petitioner 
gave no reason for wanting to forgo jury trial 
other than to save time, this is not such a case, 
and petitioner does not claim that it is. 
Id. at 37-38; 88 S.Ct. at 791 (footnote omitted). In light of this 
statement, the prosecution's consent does not appear to be an 
inflexible condition precedent to trial before a judge alone. At 
the very least, one may conclude that Singer suggests an exception 
to the general rule when "passion, prejudice or public feelings" 
would deny an accused a fair and impartial trial. See id.; see 
also State v. Black, 551 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1976) (stating "[tjhis 
right may be waived in some instances") and State v. Robbins, 709 
P.2d 771, 772 (Utah 1985) (considering whether claim of 
"prejudicial publicity" amounted to denial of impartial jury 
trial) . 
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The parties in the instant case appeared for a jury trial, 
when Defendant, upon careful consideration, moved the trial court 
to waive her right to a jury trial (R. 139:3-4) . The reasons for 
Defendant's waiver included: (a) the seriousness of the charges, 
the crucial issue of consent, and the relatively fine line between 
the issue of consent in the instant case; (b) that, given the issue 
of consent, there are lesser included offenses requiring a weighing 
of factors more objectively analyzed by a court; and (c) the "high 
profile" publicity and nature of the allegations in this case (R. 
139:4-6). The prosecution objected to the waiver, contending that 
Defendant's concerns could be addressed through the voir dire and 
jury instruction process (R. 139:7-8). In the course of its 
argument, the prosecution essentially acknowledged the merits of 
the lesser included offenses, and that the case had drawn the 
publicity stated by Defendant (R. 139:7-10).1X 
The trial court initially acknowledged the relevant case law 
along with the general rule that a defendant cannot waive a jury 
trial without the approval of the court and consent of the 
nThe record contains a Media Request for Still Photography by 
the Salt Lake Tribune, submitted on August 4, 2011, at 9:20 a.m., and 
signed by the trial court the same day (R. 120) . That next weekend, 
an article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, referring to this case 
as the "lunch lady sex case". See Stephen Hunt, High Court Will 
Decide Judge v. Jury in Lunch Lady Sex Case, Salt Lake Tribune, 
October 9, 2010, at B3, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
to this Brief as Addendum E. 
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prosecution (R. 139:10-11). However, the court expressed concern 
about the "tremendous control" placed in the hands of the 
prosecution to determine whether the case will be tried by the jury 
or the court (R. 139:11:2-16) . The trial court also indicated that 
it "would prefer the jury making the decision [as trier of fact] 
rather than the Court", and, in the process, making sure that 
Defendant understood the difference between a jury and bench trial 
(R. 139:11-12) . 
Upon confirming its understanding of Rule 17(c) and the 
applicable case law, the court stated that it did not believe a 
defendant is prevented in every case from waiving his or her right 
to a jury trial (R. 139:13:18-23). The trial court stated: 
The Court believes that upon a proper showing, that 
the defendant should be able to waive her right to 
a jury trial, that to allow the State in every case 
to defeat that would place a tremendous burden on 
the defendant that if a showing can be made, that 
there is a proper reason why the case should be 
tried to the Court rather than to the jury. It 
appears to the court that there would be an 
implication of due process rights to the defendant 
if the Court were to deny that simply because the 
State refuses to give its consent to the waiver. 
(R. 139:13-14) . 
The court granted the motion to waive the jury trial, stating 
that it was "satisfied in this case because of the nature of the 
allegations and the prior publicity along with the . . . very fine 
line between the offenses charged and the lesser included 
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offenses." (R. 139:10-14). Based on the particular circumstances 
presented, the court stated that "it would be a denial of Ms. 
Greenwood's due process rights to force her to be tried by a jury." 
(R. 139:15-17). 
After granting the prosecution's request for a recess to 
prepare a written objection, the prosecution filed its Objection to 
Waiver of a Jury Trial and supporting Memorandum (R. 114-17) . In 
its Objection, the prosecution argued that both Rule 17(c) and 
binding case law of this Court require the prosecution's consent 
for a jury trial waiver and as such the trial court should proceed 
with the scheduled jury trial {Id.). 
After entertaining additional oral argument, the trial court 
cited the Singer decision in which the Court recognized that a 
defendant's circumstances and reasons might be so compelling that 
the government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the 
denial to a defendant of an impartial trial (R. 139:23-24). The 
trial court further stated: 
I think the Supreme Court in Singer leaves 
open, as an exception to that general rule which 
the Court recognizes that that is the general rule, 
but I think, based on what has been presented, the 
reasons why the defendant wants to waive a jury in 
this case, because of the nature of the 
allegations, because of the publicity, because of 
the lesser included offenses that the cumulative 
impact of those facts seem, to this Court, to 
require that the Court grant the motion, that the 
State cannot, in every case, prevent the 
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defendant's waiver, and it's in the unusual case 
that the State -- only in the unusual case is there 
a waiver of the right would be granted, and I think 
this is the unusual case. 
(R. 139:24:8-22) . 
The trial court acted within its discretion in granting 
Defendant's motion to waive the jury trial. This decision was 
based on a thoughtful consideration of the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case, pursuant to binding case law that, at 
the very least, provides an exception to the general rule of waiver 
of trial by jury. 
C. The State Failed to Marshal the Evidence 
Supporting the Challenged Findings. 
The State's primary arguments on appeal are that the trial 
court erred by not enforcing Rule 17(c) because the prosecutor did 
not consent to the waiver, and that the trial court erroneously 
relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Singer in 
finding an exception to the general rule. See State's Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 9-18. The State's argument contains a fatal flaw. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires that xx [a] party challenging a fact finding [must] first 
marshal all the record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9); see also Beehive Tel. Co. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 2004 UT 18, f 15, 89 P.3d 131. When 
challenging the trial court's findings of fact, "[a]n [a]ppellant 
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must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence." In re Estate of Bartell, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) . 
The burden of overturning factual findings is a heavy one, 
reflecting the policy that appellate courts do not sit to retry 
cases. Id. 
The marshaled evidence must contain the appropriate citation 
to the record pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (e) . 
Utah R. App. P. 24(e); see also In re W.A., 2002 UT 127, % 45, 63 
P. 3d 607. Marshaling requires that the party challenging the 
finding show the appellate court where the evidence can be located 
and list the specific evidence supporting the verdict. See Xn re 
W.A., 2002 UT 127 at U 45 (citing Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, % 
19, 57 P.3d 1093). A party cannot avoid the duty to marshal by 
attempting to frame fact-dependent questions as legal conclusions. 
See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, <{% 19, 25, 140 P.3d 1200 (holding that 
challenges to issue consisting of mixed question of law and fact do 
not relieve party of marshaling duty). 
The State failed to marshal the evidence. Instead of 
marshaling the evidence, the State challenges only the legal ruling 
of the trial court as to waiver, which is essentially the same 
26 
argument presented to the trial court. The State makes no effort 
to challenge the underlying facts or circumstances of the trial 
court's determination that the jury trial waiver was appropriate. 
The court's underlying findings included, among others, the 
following: the circumstances surrounding the issue of consent; the 
fine line between the charged offenses and lesser included 
offenses, which the State acknowledged and the court agreed to 
consider; and the nature of the case and publicity received in the 
media. 
To properly discharge the marshaling duty, a party is required 
to "temporarily remove [its] own prejudices and fully embrace the 
adversary's position"; [it] must play the 'devil's advocate.'" 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 78, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting Harding 
v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, % 19, 57 P.3d 1093). In so doing, the 
appellant must present the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light 
favorable to its case. Id. Thus, to properly marshal the 
evidence, "the challenging party must demonstrate how the court 
found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those 
findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." United Park 
City Mines, Co., 2006 UT 35 at U 26. This the State failed to do. 
"If the marshaling requirement is not met, the appellate court 
has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone." 
27 
Chen, 2004 UT 82 at f 80 (citing Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. 
Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 26, 54 P.3d 1177); see also State v. Clark, 
2005 UT 75, % 17, 124 P.3d 235. "If appellants have failed to 
properly marshal the evidence, [the appellate court] assume[s] that 
the evidence supports the trial court's findings. Chen, 2 002 UT 82 
at 80 (citing Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 
(Utah 1998)); see also Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 
1991) ("If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court . . . . " ) . 
D, The State Failed to Provide this Court with an 
Adequate Record of the Predicated Error. 
"When a [party] predicates error to this Court, [it] has the 
duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an 
adequate record. Absent that record, [the party's] assignment of 
error stands as a unilateral allegation which the review court has 
no power to determine." State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 
1988). "This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends 
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record." 
Id. (citations omitted). "The burden of showing error is on the 
party who seeks to upset the judgment. In the absence of record 
evidence to the contrary, [the appellate court] assume[s] 
regularity in the proceedings below, and affirm[s] the judgment." 
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State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. 
Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978); State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 
73, 513 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973); Whetton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47, 497 
P.2d 856 (Utah 1972); State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 239, 419 
P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1966)). 
In the instant case, the parties appeared before the district 
court for a preliminary hearing on April 7, 2 010, during which 
A.B., the alleged victim, testified at length (R. 16). A 
transcript of the preliminary hearing was neither requested nor 
produced as part the record on appeal. 
Approximately a month later, Defendant moved the trial court 
to admit evidence of the victim's juvenile record of prior sexual 
misconduct pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 412(b)(2)(A) (R. 24-
26). An underlying claim of the Motion was that A.B.'s juvenile 
record included a sex abuse charge (R. 25) . Defendant, in the 
Motion, argued that the relationship was consensual in nature and 
that Defendant, at times, was threatened and intimidated by A.B. 
into the sexual conduct (Id.). Defendant further argued that given 
the consensual nature of the relationship, the charges would be 
significantly different (Id.). The prosecution ardently opposed 
the Motion, arguing that A.B.'s alleged sexual behavior was 
inadmissible under Rule 412 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 27-
37) . 
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The trial court deferred ruling on the 412 Motion until 
counsel provided the court with the juvenile court records (R. 48). 
Later, on June 17, 2 010, counsel appeared before the district court 
and presented oral argument on the Motion (R. 53) . However, a 
transcript of the hearing is not part of the record on appeal. 
Because the transcripts of the previously mentioned 
proceedings are not part of the record - the record is silent 
concerning matters critical to the trial court findings, which, in 
turn, served as a basis for granting Defendant's waiver of a trial 
by jury. These matters included the relatively fine line between 
the issue of consent in the instant case, and that, given the issue 
of consent, there are lesser included offenses requiring a weighing 
of factors to be analyzed by a court. As such, the State, upon 
whom the burden lies, failed to provide this Court with a complete 
record of all the evidence that was before the trial court that is 
relevant to the alleged error. Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 
1024 (Utah 1994) (citing Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) (requiring 
transcript of "all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion"). Because the State failed to provide an adequate 
record on appeal on the waiver of jury trial issue, this Court will 
"presume the correctness of the proceedings below . . . ." State 
v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 48, 27 P.3d 1115 (citing State v. Wetzel, 
868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993)). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court affirm the trial court's grant of her waiver of trial by 
jury, and that the Court grant her any other relief it deems just 
or appropriate under the circumstances. 
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Transcript of Hearing 
August 4, 2010 
PROCEEDINGS 
BAILIFF: Sorry, Your Honor. Mr. 
Arrington, I think, just walked to the restroom. 
THE COURT: That's fine. It took me a 
little longer than I anticipated. Alright, we're 
on the record in the case of State of Utah v. 
Jamie Lynn Greenwood. It's Case 010400544. 
Counsel will state their appearances, please. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Mark Arrington 
representing Jamie Greenwood, co-counsel with Jim 
Retallick. 
THE COURT: Alright, and for the State? 
MS. CRANDALL: Kirn Ciandall and Marc 
Mathis for the State, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright, and the defendant 
is present. We're outside the presence of the jury 
panel. I did have an in chambers meeting with all 
counsel this morning. Mr. Arrington indicated that 
Ms. Greenwood wanted to waive her right to be tried 
by jury, and I was informed the State objected to 
that. So I wanted to put that on the record. Mr. 
Arrington, I'll hear from you. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Well, Your Honor, and 
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obviously, as I've been talking with my client over 
the months, and especially the last few weeks 
looking at options, discussing the numerous avenues 
that we have, and weighing the particulars of this 
case, my client wants to place her confidence and 
trust in having a bench trial at this time, and 
wishes to waive the option or the right of a jury. 
THE COURT: Alright, and Ms. Greenwood, 
is that accurate? Is that what you would like to 
do? 
MS. GREENWOOD: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Arrington, without 
getting too far into the specifics of it, I've 
looked at a few of the cases in this area and also 
the rule. The Court, I believe, to make a 
decision, would need to know the reason behind that 
waiver if I'm going to be able to grant it, and 
I'll hear from you, Mr. Arrington. I don't want to 
get into the facts of it, but just generally, the 
reason that Ms. Greenwood wants to waive a trial by 
jury. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Well, and just to make 
it clear, Your Honor, she understands she has the 
constitutional right to choose a jury of her peers 
chosen from the community. I've explained that to 
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her exhaustively. She feels that, first of all, to 
say nothing of judicial comity and so forth, that 
her faith and her belief about getting a fair and 
reasonable and objective trier of fact at this 
point and under the circumstances of this case lies 
greater with a bench trial, rather than a jury and 
believes that the legal analysis that's going to be 
applied specifically to this case, the argument is 
not if illegal circumstances happened. She 
cooperated with authorities on this and gave 
admissions. The question that this whole case 
surrounds is a question of consent, and reviewing 
the law with my client, believes that there is a 
relatively fine line b e t w e e n — i n issues of consent. 
If there is consent under the 
circumstances and the facts of the case between the 
victim and my client, then there are lesser 
included offenses than what she is charged with. 
We believe that having an analytical and legal pre-
trained mind looking and weighing the factors is 
going to give her a much more objective decision 
than trying to, in a very short time, explain and 
try to articulate to a jury the fine lines between 
perhaps rape and unlawful sexual activity or 
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and for this 
THACKERdCO 
ThackerCo.com 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-983-2180 | 877-441-2180 
Fax:801-983-2181 
Transcript of Hearing 08/04/10 6 
reason, she is choosing to go with the bench as a 
trier of fact. 
THE COURT: Alright. Does part of the 
decision to ask to waive the jury, does that have 
anything to do with the publicity in this case, or 
the nature of the allegations? 
MR. ARRINGTON: It does, Your Honor. 
It does, although the last couple of final pre-
trials, for instance, that we've had hasn't 
included media. It was heavily in the media at the 
time and feels that there was at least some 
exposure, if not quite a bit of exposure. There 
was multiple channels and T.V. stations. Her 
picture is plastered on the website at KSL and the 
State has maintained in their negotiations that 
this is a public interest, high-profile case and 
that causes concern for my client as well and, 
again, feels that a bench trial is going to be more 
objective in looking specifically at the facts and 
not weighing out the media and the impression that 
they may have already made upon the public down 
here in the Salt Lake Valley. 
THE COURT: Alright, and as to the 
lesser and included offenses, I will tell all 
counsel that I spent quite a bit of time yesterday 
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looking at the case, and also specifically dealing 
with lesser included offenses. I do believe that 
if the matter were tried by a jury, that a court, 
at this point, preliminarily at least, would be 
inclined to submit some lesser and included 
offenses, and I don't know whether based on that, 
that would change Ms. Greenwood's decision on 
requesting the waiver of the jury. 
MR. ARRINGTON: It would not, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. Mr. Arrington, is 
there anything further at this time? 
MR. ARRINGTON: I would submit it on 
those arguments, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright, and Ms. Crandall? 
MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, this morning 
is the first we've even heard it. I understand 
he's been in discussion for the last couple of 
weeks about it, but this is the first the State 
ever even heard of this. When we had the pretrial 
last week, it never came up about her possibly 
waiving the jury trial. 
Rule 17(c), under the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, is clear. It says all felony cases 
shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives 
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a jury in open court with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the prosecution. This is a case 
where the prosecution is not consenting to the 
waiver. I understand the concerns with the legal 
arguments, but that's what we're here for. We're 
here to explain to the jury what needs to happen 
and instruct them on the law. That's why we have 
the jury instructions, and that's why we're going 
to go through this voir dire process. If there 
were huge concerns as far as the media or something 
like that, then it should have been brought up 
before now. We could have done a jury 
questionnaire or something like that to try to 
alleviate some of those concerns, but we're here 
now. We didn't do that. It's just going to have 
to go through the voir dire process, and then 
through the instruction process. 
As far as the lesser included, the 
State's position is that the ones that have been 
submitted by Mr. Arrington are probably 
appropriate, other than a few variations, and I 
have prepared that I'll work on and can hand out 
after lunch to Your Honor and Counsel. I think 
they are a little bit-- They deal with 16 and 17 
year-olds. I think the facts of this case will 
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support a finding that only one offense happened 
when he was 16, the rest would have been when he 
was 15. So I think, just as far as the lesser 
included, we maybe need to re-work those so I'll 
have some I'll submit. We're not objecting to the 
lesser included. 
And I think the J u r y — j u r i e s all the 
time find guilty if they are going to find guilty 
on a lesser included, they do. It's a disservice 
to them to say that they are unable to do that and 
understand the law. 
THE COURT: Mr. Crandall, Mr. Arrington 
indicated that the DA's office has indicated that 
this is a public interest, high profile case. Do 
you have any comment on that? 
MS. CRANDALL: Well, £ think that that, 
as Mr. Arrington said, yes. There has been media 
interest in it. I received a phone call from Steve 
Hunt at The Tribune yesterday wondering if it was 
going forward. We're not denying that, but that 
shouldn't be a deciding factor over whether or not 
it's a judge or a bench trial, or a bench trial or 
a jury trial. If that was a concern, then, as I 
said, that needed to be addressed through a jury 
questionnaire process which, you know, we do jury 
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questionnaires all the time. I did one a couple 
weeks ago on a case. So that could have easily 
been handled. Now is not the time to say that 
because it's high profile, that at this point it 
should be a bench trial, and I don't have it in 
front of me right now, but I know there's Utah 
Supreme Court case law on this issue and if you are 
inclined to look at that, if you give us some time, 
we can run downstairs and get a motion to that 
effect. 
THE COURT: Ms. Crandall, I have looked 
at State v. Serpent, S-E-R-P-E-N-T, a 1989 decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. I've also looked at 
State of Utah v. Robbins, a 1985 decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court, and I've also looked at State 
of Utah v. Davis, the 1984 decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Robb ins case and the other 
cases indicate that as a general rule, that the 
defendant cannot waive a right to a jury trial in a 
felony case, and I understand that I'm bound by 
that, but with that said, the defendant is the one 
that is on trial. The defendant is the one that 
faces a loss of freedom for life, and certainly has 
a right to a jury trial, but the Courts have held, 
generally, that she's not — that a defendant is not 
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entitled to generally waive that right to a jury. 
The Court is concerned that the 
defendant, in order to waive that right, has to 
have the consent of both the Court and the 
prosecution, and if the Court were inclined to give 
its consent and the State did not in this case, it 
seems to this Court that it really places a 
tremendous control over the action in the hands of 
the prosecution when the prosecution and the Court 
understands that the prosecution is representing 
the State, but the State is not the one that's 
subject to a loss of liberty, and the Court is 
concerned about the State having the ability to 
control the case from the standpoint of whether 
it's going to be tried by the jury or by the 
Court . 
I will indicate to all parties that I 
would prefer the jury making that decision rather 
than the Court, and I should indicate, Ms. 
Greenwood, that before you could be convicted, all 
eight members of the jury would have to unanimously 
agree that you were guilty of each and every charge 
alleged and, ma'am, do you understand the 
difference between the jury trial and the bench 
trial that with a jury trial, all eight members of 
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the jury would have to unanimously agree, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that you were guilty of the 
offense charged or offenses charged, but with a 
bench trial, that there would only be one finder of 
fact and that would be the Court, and so instead of 
having to convince eight people, the State would 
only have to agree one and I would ask Mr. 
Arrington if you would take a moment and just make 
sure that Ms. Greenwood understands that. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Yes, thank you. 
(Inaudible discussion) 
MR. ARRINGTON: If I may address the 
Court, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, please. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Thank you. I have 
explained to her prior to this, I have visited her 
at least once every two weeks to ten days or even 
lately every several days the last few weeks and 
spent time with her and she does understand that 
the idea of a unanimous jury, that all eight jurors 
would have to find unanimously in favor of the 
State, whether it's the charges filed or we're 
hoping would be lesser included offenses. Even 
those must be by unanimous decision and that should 
there be one, even one strong hold out out of eight 
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jurors that would not budge, then we end up with a 
hung jury. She does know that under the 
circumstances, if there were a hung jury that the 
State would have the option of re-trying her, 
basically, a whole new trial and that should she go 
with a bench, that her fate would lie in the 
decision of one individual, tat being this Court. 
She still feels strongly that she believes the more 
objective and fairness option between the jury and 
the bench lies with the bench. 
THE COURT: Alright, and is there 
anything further from either counsel? 
MR. ARRINGTON: We would submit, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Crandall? 
MS. CRANDALL: No, Your Honor. The 
State has made its position clear. 
THE COURT: The Court understands the 
conflicting interests and the Court also 
understands the rule, Rule 17(c) and the cases that 
have come down; however, the Court does not believe 
that that in every case prevents a defendant from 
waiving their right to a jury trial. The Court 
believes that upon a proper showing, that the 
defendant should be able to waive her right to a 
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jury trial, that to allow the State in every case 
to defeat that would place a tremendous burden on 
the defendant that if a showing can be made, that 
there is a proper reason why the case should be 
tried to the Court rather than to the jury. It 
appears to the court that there would be an 
implication of due process rights to the defendant 
if the Court were to deny that simply because the 
State refuses to give its consent to the waiver. 
The Court is satisfied in this case 
because of the nature of the allegations and the 
prior publicity, along with the, as Mr. Arrington 
indicated, the very fine line between the offenses 
charged and the potential lesser included offenses. 
The Court believes that it would be a denial of Ms. 
Greenwood's due process rights to force her to be 
tried by a jury. The defense motion to waive the 
jury is granted. 
I will need to take a few moments and 
speak to the jury and let them know that their 
services are not going to be needed. I'm not going 
to go into any detail with them. With that said, 
I assume, Ms. Crandall, that you probably 
anticipated that you would not present any 
witnesses until this afternoon, I'm assuming. 
THACKER+CO 
ThackerCo.com 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City.UT 84101 
801-983-2180 | 877-441-2180 
Fax:801-983-2181 


























MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, yes. If we 
could have a recess, we'll decide where we're going 
to go from here. Are you willing to even look at 
this motion that we could put together within ten 
minutes ? 
THE COURT: If you want to do that, I 
will certainly consider it, you know, where I am at 
this point, but if there's something else that you 
would like to submit to convince the Court 
otherwise, Ms. Crandall, I'll give you an 
opportunity to do so. I don't want to foreclose 
you from presenting anything that you want 
regarding the motion because it is a very important 
motion to both the state and to the defendant. So 
if you want ten minutes, we'll recess and give you 
that opportunity. 
MS. CRANDALL: Okay, thank you, Your 
Honor. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Recess) 
THE COURT: Alright, let's go back on 
the record. We're back on the record in the case 
of State of Utah v. Jamie Lynn Greenwood. The 
defendant is present and so are both counsel. 
Before we get to the matter we were addressing 
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before the recess, juror number 51 is Dr. Brown. He 
has surgery scheduled at noon. Unless there is 
some objection, I would like to excuse him now. Is 
there any objection to the excusing Dr. Brown at 
this time from the State? 
MS. CRANDALL: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: From the defendant? 
MR. RETALLICK: No, Your Honor. 
MR. ARRINGTON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright, Casey, if you would 
let Dr. Brown know that he is excused. I've also 
now received the State's objection to waiver of the 
jury trial and memorandum in support thereof. I 
will indicate to counsel that I misspelled, when I 
indicated that I read cases, the case that was not 
applicable was Case v. Serpent. That is not 
applicable, and that was included in all of the 
ones that I read, but that has no application to 
this issue, and I'll hear from the State, but I 
will tell the State that I've seen that motion 
because it appears to be very similar to State v. 
Fagness, and I had the benefit of that file. 
That's where I got those earlier cases. S o — 
MR. MATHIS: And, Your Honor, we do 
have copies of the case law that is cited in that 
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motion if you've had an opportunity to read. 
THE COURT: If you would like to argue 
that, I'll hear from you, Mr. Mathis. 
MR. MATHIS: Well, I just have copies 
for the Court before proceeding. 
THE COURT: Oh, alright. Thank you. 
Alright, and I had previously seen Davis and 
Robbins. If you would give me a moment to look at 
Black and Singer. 
MR. MATHIS: Your Honor, I believe that 
the State did submit those, the Studham case is 
attached to the Robbins case, and that's stapled 
separately. 
THE COURT: Alright, alright, thank you. 
Alright, I'll hear from the State, Mr. Mathis or 
Ms. Crandall? 
MR. MATHIS: Your Honor, I think, just 
to echo the earlier argument that the plain reading 
of the Rule 17(c) clearly does indicate that in 
order for a defendant to waive or for there to be 
a waiver of a jury trial, that three things need to 
happen: (1) that the defendant requests it, (2) 
that the Court approves it, and (3) that the State 
gives its consent. 
This identical issue was brought up in 
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State v. Robbins, which is a Utah Supreme Court 
case; State v. Davis, which is another Utah Supreme 
Court case; State v. Studham, additionally a Utah 
Supreme Court case, and Singer v. United States, a 
United States Supreme Court case. In all the Utah 
Supreme Court cases, judge, the Supreme Court held 
that it is a meritless argument to say that it is 
an unconstitutional rule that they have violated 
due process by denying the waiver of a jury trial. 
I don't know that — I have not heard any 
authority that the defendant has cited that would, 
could even come close to circumventing these cases 
or give a separate rationale to say that we're not 
making that same argument. They're making the 
identical argument and this — I believe that the 
Supreme Court is saying that it is a meritless 
claim because it is well settled law. 
I think the plain language of the rule 
which is accepted by the Utah Supreme Court, plus 
the Utah Supreme Court rulings in all the 
aforementioned cases and the holding in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case clearly states that the 
Constitution's guarantee of a fair trial gives a 
defendant a right to safeguard themselves against 
possible jury prejudice by insisting on trial 
THACKERiCO 
ThackerCo.com 
50 West Broadway, Suite 903 
Salt Lake CHy,UT 84101 
801-983-2180 | 877-441-2180 
Fax:801-983-2181 
Transcript of Hearing 08/04/10 19 
before the judge alone. That is not the argument 
that's necessarily being made today. 
In light of the Constitution emphasis on 
a jury trial, we find it difficult to understand 
how the petitioner could submit the bald 
proposition that to compel the defendant in a 
criminal case to undergo a jury trial against his 
will is contrary to the right to a fair trial or 
due process. There is no constitutional impediment 
to a conditioning a waiver of this right on the 
consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial 
judge when, if either refuses to consent, the 
result is simply that the defendant is subject to 
an impartial trial by the jury, the very thing that 
the Constitution guarantees them. 
That's what we're dealing with today, 
Judge, and I think that it's very well settled law 
that there is no defendant right to waive a jury 
trial in the absence of consent of the State. _ 
THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Mr. 
Arrington or Mr. Retallick, anything further? 
MR. RETALLICK: Well, Your Honor, 
it's difficult. We're at a disadvantage. We don't 
have an office with law clerks that can run down in 
the extended ten minute break and write up a brief 
THACKERdCO 
ThackerCo.com 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-983-2180 | 877441-2180 
Fax:801-983-2181 
Transcript of Hearing 08/04/10 20 
in this matter, Your Honor, but we do maintain that 
some of the cases that's cited indicate that there 
are certain circumstances where this right to a 
jury may be waived in some instances and the Court 
has the discretion which the Court exercised here. 
I just don't have the time and I don't know if Mr. 
Arrington has anything to add to provide further 
legal analysis to this because, as I say, we've 
just received these cases and we're going through 
them right now. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Just to echo, Your 
Honor, just that the way the law is written here in 
Utah, and under which-- a 1though there's similar 
cases, I don't know that they're identical as far 
as the charges are concerned. There is a legal 
fine line between the charges that have been — in 
fact, if I can go back for a moment. She was 
originally booked on charges that we've asked for 
jury instructions of the lesser included offenses. 
The State, upon reviewing the information and the 
discovery submitted by the police department, 
amends the charges to include the rape, the first 
degree felonies. 
There is a fine line in between the 
charges filed and the charges she was arrested on, 
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and what we're asking for if this goes to a jury, 
to the lesser included offenses. It boils down to 
an issue of consent, and there is jury instructions 
that have been submitted by the State that we're 
going to, at least when it comes to that, take 
issue as to defining coercion, enticement, those 
kinds of things and have brought case law to back 
that up. 
The point being is that there--it's 
going to take, whether it's a bench trial or a jury 
trial, fine hair analysis and coming down to an 
issue of factual v. legal consent in this case, and 
reiterating that my client is, although it would 
rest with a single individual, that being this 
Court, to decide her fate. She is more comfortable 
because we go to deliberation with a legal mind 
versus the jury who, in all likelihood, have no 
understanding of the details and the fine analysis 
between rape and unlawful sexual intercourse and 
unlawful sexual conduct involving a minor, and I 
don't know that they are going to be, although we 
do normally rely on Americans to be intelligent and 
objective in our daily dealings, I don't know that 
they are going to be able to completely understand 
the gravamen in the short time we have in giving 
THACKERiCO 
ThackerCo.com 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-983-2180 | 877-441-2180 
Fax:801-983-2181 
Transcript of Hearing 08/04/10 22 
jury instructions and for them weighing 
objectively, again, with the media attention that 
has been present on this case. I submit. 
THE COURT: Alright, Mr. Mathis? 
MR. MATHIS: Judge, first I would like 
to respond to the issue that was raised that the 
defense is not given the same advantage as we have. 
I can assure you, we also do not have law clerks 
that do this research for us. We have to do it on 
our own, number one. Number two, given the 
defendant's own admission, this is something that 
they've been talking about for months. So to say 
that this is an unanticipated argument, I think, is 
unpersuasive to me and I believe to be unpersuasive 
to the Court . 
Given also the arguments given by 
defendant today, his claim is that he is afraid 
that the, or that he believes that the Court will 
be more fair and objective than the jury who hasn't 
even been, we haven't even gone through the voir 
dire process. So without even going through the 
voir dire process, Your Honor, I think that that 
puts the burden on the Court, if the Court stays 
with its original ruling, to make the finding that 
the jury pool, as assembled today, is unfair and 
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would be unobjective in hearing the matter today, 
and I think the safe argument, although I haven't 
talked to Mr. Arrington or his colleague today, say 
that they have much more experience than I do or 
Ms. Crandall combined discussing and arguing to 
juries the fine lines of legal analysis in 
different laws. To say that we're unable to do 
that, or they would be unable to do that, I think, 
Your Honor, is just unpersuasive . I mean, that's 
what the very trial is and what it entails. 
THE COURT: Alright, thank you, counsel. 
Let me just say that in my short time on the 
bench, I have been surprised and amazed at the 
collective wisdom of the juries that I've had the 
experience of viewing here in this Courtroom. 
In looking at the Supreme Court, United 
States Supreme Court decision of Singer v. The 
United States, I'm looking at the last page of 
that, the Court states: we need not determine in 
this case whether there might be some circumstances 
where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried 
by a judge alone are so compelling that the 
government's insistence on trial by jury would 
result in the denial of a defendant of an impartial 
trial. Petitioner argues that there might arise 
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situations where passion, prejudice, public feeling 
or some other factor may render impossible or 
unlikely by an impartial trial by jury; however, 
since petitioner gave no reason for wanting to 
forego jury trial, other than to save time, this is 
not such a case and the petitioner does not claim 
that it is. 
I think the Supreme Court in Singer 
leaves open, as an exception to that general rule 
which the Court recognizes that that is the general 
rule, but I think, based on what has been 
presented, the reasons why the defendant wants to 
waive a jury in this case, because of the nature of 
the allegations, because of the publicity, because 
of the lesser included offenses that the cumulative 
impact of those factors seem, to this Court, to 
require that the Court grant the motion, that the 
State cannot, in every case, prevent the 
defendant's waiver, and it's in the unusual case 
that the State — only in the unusual case is there a 
waiver of the right would be granted, and I think 
this is the unusual case. 
The Court believes that to not waive 
the—not allow the defendant to waive a jury trial 
implicates her due process rights and for those 
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reasons the motion is granted. 
We will take a recess. I will excuse 
the jury panel and, Ms. Crandall, when did you 
anticipate starting testimony? 
MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, the State 
won't be beginning today. If Your Honor would 
issue a written finding, we'll be planning on doing 
an interlocutory appeal on this. 
THE COURT: And does counsel want to be 
heard on that? 
MR. ARRINGTON: Well, Your Honor, 
granted that our concern is my client was 
originally arrested on third degree felony charges. 
She was booked into the jail, bail was set at ten 
thousand dollars for third degree felonies, which 
is a little high, but she paid that bail. The 
State got the case, got the information, amended 
the information, re-filed it as first degree 
felony. She was booked on bail of five hundred 
thousand dollars, even though she is 42 years old. 
She has no prior record. She's born and raised in 
Utah. She has been in the same house for 13 years. 
She's been married for 20 years. 
We were able to get the bail down to 
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; however, 
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that is way above anything that she or her family 
combined to come up with. Understanding that the 
interlocutory appeal is going to take some time, 
she has been a model prisoner. She has even been 
in as a trustee during her stay. She's been in 
custody for five months. There have been no write-
ups or anything. I think it would be appropriate 
to re-visit her custody status and either allow her 
O.R., because she has paid a bail in this matter on 
charges that would be lesser included offenses, or 
at least place her on home confinement pre-trial 
services where she is being constantly supervised. 
It is available down here, or at least lower that 
bail down to something that's much more reasonable. 
Again, any pre-trial services, home confinement 
would be satisfactory for us. 
THE COURT: Alright, anything further 
from the State? 
MS. CRANDALL: Yes, Your Honor, just so 
we're clear. There was never an amended 
information. The defendant was booked on probable 
cause by police officers, by Sandy police, and 
that's what she was booked on. That's what she 
bonded out on. 
The State, once they received the case 
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and actually filed an information, we requested two 
hundred and fifty thousand, at which time, when I 
believe it was Judge Coriss at the time, saw the 
information, he raised it to five hundred thousand. 
We already had a bond hearing back in 
March in front of Judge Kelly. At that point, it 
was lowered to the two hundred and fifty thousand. 
He said if she bailed out, ordered pre-trial 
services after forty-eight hours. We've already 
had that hearing. I don't think what has happened 
here today really changes that in any material 
manner, and the victim has a right, if you are 
inclined to grant for some reason, even though 
there's no legal basis to do so, another bond 
hearing, and we have the right to have the victim 
present, at least speak to him and get some input 
from him. 
MR. ARRINGTON: And we would stipulate 
to a bond hearing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Arrington and Mr. 
Retallick, what is the defendant's position on not 
proceeding with the trial. The State, apparently, 
is going to take an interlocutory appeal, and 
whether or not that will be granted, the Court 
anticipated that we would go ahead and proceed with 
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the trial. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Well, I think the 
interlocutory appeal has been availed just because 
it requires a disposition, I think. We're 
objecting to--we would like to go forward with the 
trial today and proceed. The interlocutory appeal 
is going to take some time. It's going to involve 
other counsel, lots of legal argument and 
preparation I think that this Court is well aware 
of. We would like to proceed with trial today. 
MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, if I may, 
just one additional point on the interlocutory 
appeal. I've been involved in many of them and one 
of the keys to the interlocutory appeal is that the 
issue that is sought to be decided by the Court of 
Appeals must be--have some dispositive impact on 
the case before the Court. It's not dispositive. 
The only decision would be to reverse you and say 
we should have a jury. Having a jury or not 
having a jury is not going to be dispositive of the 
underlying charges. 
Typical interlocutory appeal is on a 
suppression issue where the district court — someone 
claims the district court made an error. So if the 
evidence--if the denial of the suppression hearing 
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is reversed, the evidence is allowed in, then that 
becomes dispositive if everything else flows 
through it. 
And so I think, in this claim of a 
right to an interlocutory appeal, while they may 
file it, I don't believe it's provident, and I 
believe it's just another delaying tactic to keep 
defendant in custody longer than absolutely 
necessary. 
THE COURT: Alright, anything further 
from the State? 
MS. CRANDALL: Other than, Your Honor, 
to say this is a delaying tactic to keep the 
defendant in custody is highly offensive. This is 
the first we've heard of even them saying that they 
wanted to waive the jury trial was this morning. 
It hasn't even been brought up. We're just kind of 
snow-balled with it. It's up to the Court of 
Appeals to decide whether or not the interlocutory 
appeal is appropriate and if Your Honor's decision 
is appropriate, and we have the right to request 
that . 
THE COURT: Alright. What we're going to 
do, we will recess until tomorrow morning at 8:30. 
I intend to proceed with the trial at 8:30, unless 
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the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals directs 
me to do otherwise. Thank you. We'll see you 
back here at 8:30 tomorrow morning. 
MR. MATHIS: Your Honor, will the Court 
be placing its findings in writing, or would you 
like defense or the State to do that? 
THE COURT: Mr. Arrington or Mr. 
Retallick, could you prepare findings and an order 
on the motion, and how long would you need to do 
that? 
MR. RETALLICK: If we can get a copy of 
the audio tape, Your Honor, of this proceeding, we 
can get it done probably by the end of the day. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Your Honor, obviously, 
this tape would be to get it done before the end 
of the day in order to contact the Attorney 
General's Office. 
MR. RETALLICK: Okay, it gets two 
minutes, Your Honor. It's 10:30. We could have it 
probably done by 1:00. 
THE COURT: Alright. That will be the 
order. Have that submitted. We'll give you our e-
mail for both the Court, and if the District 
Attorney's Office would give them your e-mail and 
we'll expect that by 1:00 o'clock. Thank you. 
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We'll be in recess. 
MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, maybe, just 
so we can track where we're at, if we could have a 
Court hearing maybe later this afternoon. We can 
make sure we have those written rulings and, I 
think, at that point, we'll be able to--maybe we 
can give Your Honor the State's better position as 
far as the Attorney General's Office and Court of 
Appeals would say on the matter. I don't know if 
there's any objection to that. I think--
THE COURT: Well, I suppose we could do 
it by phone. Mr. Retallick has to return to Ogden 
to get that done, and Mr. Arrington to North Salt 
Lake. So what is your preference, Mr. Arrington or 
Mr. Retallick? 
MS. CRANDALL: A phone conference is 
fine . 
MR. ARRINGTON: Telephone conference. 
MR. RETALLICK: Telephone conference 
would be fine, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. We will plan on a 
telephone conference at 1:30 then. 
MR. RETALLICK: Very good, Your Honor. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And my clerk will set that 
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up . Thank you. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Very well. Thank you. 
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THIRD 5s f t J r r^ 
IN THE THIR I) J I JDICIAI DIS I R IC r COUR r, WEST JORDANDEjp^TMJET^ 
SAI ;T LAKE COT JN TY, STATE OF i JTAH ^ K T JORDAN Dtt i 
* 
' • l E O F U I AH, * 
Plaintiff, * DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S 
* MOTION TOWMVE 
v. * TRIAL m Jl)R\ 
* 
JAMIE GREEN' * ' Case INo. ..M.400544 
Defendara * Honorable Robert W. Adkins 
11 IIS MATTER came before the Court prior ;o the beginning ol the jur> seieuh n 
process in the trial of the abo\ c-eapuoned mallei Detense counsel on behalf of Defendant, 
move o ..au in- , : !?. -a: :>:er and u proceed with a bench tria* I 'lie State objected to 
the v i:*e- ; aa- i . .aa. .. - • ** am aai Procedure, 
The Court, after having reviewed the applicable case ;a * n I area, rc^ucMed vn o 
Counsel u- state on ilic record the basis for the motion. After receiving the basis for the motion 
and liu* Slate's argument m olijection thereto, this Court hereby makes the following ruling: 
1. • c * u, • . .-u-rv.aiMs k ai : <-.;• *-f'ihe 1 tah Rules i Criminal Procedure and the case 
am apphuna v--!u aa r "* M' l,a:^ a; - a -pe* Mu ^ H K - I 
defendant should be able to \\ui\o lus OI hci rijihi k> ,I |ur\ u; . - :> * 'h* ' '..> :" 
every case to defeat this ability would pia.ee a tremendous burden upon a Defendant and a 
tremendous amount of power in the hands of the State. The State, although representing 
h
- peopu J. a anieu * the ios-,
 (P \hcn\ as is a defendant. 
'".
 :!u- a i •' ;licws l!:a? "4 . ! '!anJ • i -a : .h* a • nil j piv;>.T'ui-^ ajj*. . j 
delendant desires to wane a ua\, in ** air heiie\ea mat -\ denying sa.h roqi a-! in-
at the objection of the State would implicate the due process rights of the Defendant. 
3. The Court is satisfied that Defendant has met &m burden because of the nature oi the ease, 
I au^], , .;ml. _ L , iLi reached md the fine line between the offenses charged and 
lesser ;IN.. . ;-;d o!"ien-;c w:- ' • i-.JL-N*. 
OOuin *r 
decision of Singer v United States, the Supreme Court stated, "we need not determine in 
this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for 
wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence 
on a trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial." This 
Court believes that the cumulative impact of the factors stated above creates such an 
unusual circumstance. 
4. This Court finds that it would be a denial of Defendant's due process rights to refuse to 
honor Defendant's request to waive a jury trial. Therefore, Defendant's motion is hereby 
granted. 
DATED this / day of August, 2010. 
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Rule 17. i"he trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend it i person and by counsel. The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial wit! i the following exceptions;; 
(1) In prosecutions of i nisdemeanors and ii fractions, defendai it i i lay coi isei it in i wi itii tg to ti ial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial f< n gc x id cai jse si ic r N\ i " I i tcl r w ay ii iclude tumultuous, riotous, or 
obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court i i lay require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
;
 misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury.i ii iless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approvdl ui ihi.' i min i ,i I 
the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written dei i land at least ten days prior to trial, 
or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section • -to J , u • - - --. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval of the comt, by 
stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of 
jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in III IMIII: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement ai id the defei ise i I ray i i lake an openii ig statement or reserve 
it until the prosecution has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support: of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecutioi I has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; ai id 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open 
the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. The court 
may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall 
proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of 
jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as provided ii i tl lis sectioi i. 
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its roie 
as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror 
and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they may write the question as it 
occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the jurors that 
some questions might not be allowed. 
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties arid iule upoiI aily objection to the question. 
The judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the 
court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. 
The question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the 
witness after the juror's question. 
Rule 17 Page 2 of 2 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of 
an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer 
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak 
to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary 
delay or at a specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished 
by the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion 
thereon until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been 
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as 
exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are 
entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall 
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an 
officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the 
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any 
himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, 
communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they 
shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that 
the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to 
the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in 
its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry 
and the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or 
the jury may be sent out again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an 
order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Advisory Committe.£..Motes 
I.ihl) 
24 OCTOBER TERM, 1964. 
C n i >f tin s O m fc, 380II S. 
SINCE!* • V I T E D STATES. 
CERTI •« i n r t N i iE i ) ST A iKh * IwURT 01 ' APPEALS 
FOR T H E N I N T H CIRCUIT. 
No. 42 Armii'd NY'V-ml*-;- !V l{i(V4—In-ndcd Mi..-h - i'.»u>. 
Petitioner, a Ueri'iidunt -:i .* Lx.U:rai n iminai mail iniua case, claims 
that he had an absolute right to be tried by a judge alone if he 
considered such a trial to be to his advantage. Held: Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 23 (a) sets forth a reasonable procedure 
governing proffered waivers of jury trials. A defendant's only 
. constitutional, right concerning the method of trial is to an impar-
tial trial" by .jury. Although he may waive his right to trial by 
jury, Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, there is no constitu-
tional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this right on the 
consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if 
either refuses to consent, the result is that the defendant is subject 
to an impartial trial by jury—the very thing that the Constitution 
guarantees him. Pp. 24-38. 
326 F. 2d 132, affirmed. 
Sidney Dorjman argued the cause and filed a brief for 
petitioner. 
Beatrice Rosenberg argued the cause for the United 
States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, 
Assistant A ttorney General Miller and Sidney M, Glazer. 
Briefs' of amici curiae were filed by Victor Rabinowitz 
and Leonard Boudin for Joni Rabinowitz, and by Justin 
A. Stanley for Nicholas Jacop Uselding. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE W ARREN delivered the opinion,,, of 
the Court, 
Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides: 
"Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried 
unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing 
with, the approval, of Jh«» n,o\ irt and, 'the consent of 
the government."' 
SINGER v. UNITED STATES. 25 
24 Opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner challenges the permissibility of this rule, argu-
ing that the Constitution gives a defendant in a federal 
criminal case the right to waive a jury trial whenever he 
believes such action to be in his best interest, regardless 
of whether the prosecution and the court are willing to 
acquiesce in the waiver. 
Petitioner was charged in a federal district court with 
30 infractions of the mail fraud statute, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1341 (1958 ed.). The gist of the indictment was that he 
used the mails to dupe amateur songwriters into sending 
him money for the marketing of their songs. On the 
opening day of trial petitioner offered in writing to waive 
a trial by jury "[f]or the purpose of shortening the 
trial."* The trial court was willing to approve the 
waiver, but the Government refused to give its consent. 
Petitioner was subsequently convicted by a jury on 29 
of the 30 counts and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, 377 U. S. 903. 
Petitioner's argument is that a defendant in a federal 
criminal case has not only an unconditional constitutional 
right, guaranteed by Art. Ill , § 2, and the Sixth Amend-
ment,2 to a trial by jury, but also a correlative right to 
^ 17. 
2
 Art. Ill , §2, of the United States Constitution provides: 
"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed withm 
any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress 
may by Law have directed." 
The Sixth Amendment provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
28 OCTOBER TERM, 1964. 
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have his case decided by a judge alone if he const* - ich 
a trial to be to his advantage. He claims that at c»;; ,;oon 
law the right to refuse a jury trial preceded the right to 
demand one, and that both before and at the time our 
1
 ' ^^ i tu t ion was adopted criminal defendants in this 
m!.;itry had the right to waive a jury trial. Although 
the Constitution does not in terms, give defendants an 
option between different modes of trial, petitioner argues 
that the provisions relating to jury trial are for the pro-
tection of the accused. Petitioner further urges that 
since a defendant can waive other constitutional rights 
without the consent of the Government, he must neces-
sarily have a similar right to waive a jury trial and that 
the Constitution's guarantee of a fair trial gives defend-
ants the right to safeguard themselves against possible 
jury prejudice by insisting on a trial before; a judge alone. 
Turning his attention to Rule 23 (a), petitioner claims 
that the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments are 
violated by placing conditions on the ability to waive trial 
by jury. 
We have examined petitioner's arguments and find 
them to be without merit. We can find no evidence that 
the common law recognized that defendants had the right 
to choose between court and jury trial Although in-
stances of waiver of jury trial can be found in certain of 
the colonies prior to the adoption of the Constitution, 
they were isolated instances occurring pursuant to colo-
nial "constitutions" or statutes and were clear departures 
from the common law. There is no indication that the 
colonists considered the ability to waive a jury trial to 
be of equal importance to the right to demand one. Hav-
ing found that the Constitution neither confers nor recog-
> a right of criminal defendants to have their cases 
before a judge alone, we also conclude that Rule 
J.'*., a, ^ i * -T ;rth a reasonable procedure governing at-
tempted waivers of jury trials. 
SINGER v. UNITED STATES. 27 
24 Opinion of the Court. 
I. 
English Common Law. The origin of trial by jury in 
England is not altogether clear. At its inception it was 
an alternative to one of the older methods of proof—trial 
by compurgation, ordeal or battle. I Holdsworth, A His-
tory of English Law 326 (7th ed. 1956). Soon after the 
thirteenth century trial by jury had become the principal 
institution for criminal cases, Jenks, A Short History of 
English Law 52 (5th ed. 1938); yet, even after the older 
procedures of compurgation, ordeal and battle had passed 
into disuse, the defendant technically retained the right 
to be tried by one of them. Before a defendant could be 
subjected to jury trial his "consent" was required, but the 
Englishmen of the period had a concept of "consent" 
somewhat different from our own. The Statute of West-
minster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 12, which described defend-
ants who refused to submit to jury trial as "refusing] to 
stand to the Common Law of the Land," marks the begin-
ning of the horrendous practice known as peine forte et 
dure by which recalcitrant defendants were tortured until 
death or until they "consented" to a jury trial. 
It is significant that defendants who refused to submit 
to a jury were not entitled to an alternative method of 
trial,8 and it was only in 1772 that peine forte et dure "was 
officially abolished in England. By a statute enacted in 
that year, 12 Geo. 3, c. 20, a defendant who stood mute 
when charged with a felony was deemed to have pleaded 
guilty. Not until 1827, long after the adoption of our 
Constitution, did England provide by statute, 7 & 8 
3
 It appears that many hardy defendants were willing to be tor-
tured to death rather than submit to a jury trial, not because of 
any inherent distrust of the jury system but because of their desire 
to avoid a conviction and thereby prevent forfeiture of their lands 
and the resultant hardships for their descendants. Cf. I Holdsworth, 
supra, at 326. 
28 OCTOBER W*. irf04. 
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Geo, 4, c. 28, for the trial of those who stood mute. 
Even this statute did not give the defendant the right.to 
plead his case before a judge alone, but merely provided 
that he would be subject to jury trial without his formal 
consen-
rn ^ ^ IL! ^iisn eoMinou law g a v e 
crinuna :u- i-piion u.s to the mode of trial. 
The closest the common law came to such a procedure 
was that of the "implied confession/' described briefly in 
2 Hawkins, Pleas ol the Cmwm t\ 31 (6th ed. 1787), by 
which defendants accused of minor offenses did not ex 
plicitly admit their guilt but threw themselves on the_ 
King's mercy and expressed tlmir willingness to submit 
to a small fine. Despite the "implied confession," the 
court heard evidence and could discharge the defendant 
if it found the evidence wanting. * '\vy*\\ < Id The'Histori-
cal Development of Waiver of Jury 1 lal in Criminal 
Cases, 20 Va. L. Rev. 655, 660 (1934). It cannot seri-
ously be argued that this obscure and insignificant pro-
cedure, having no applicability to serious offenses, estab-
lishes the proposition that at common law defendants had 
the right to choose the method of trial in all criminal 
cases. On the contrary, " [b] y its intrinsic fairness as con-
trasted with older modes, and by the favor of the crown 
and the judges, [trial by jury] grew fast to be regarded as 
the one regular common-law mode of trial, always to - •* 
had when no other was fixed." Thayer, A Preliminary 
Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 60 (1898). 
The Colonial Experience. The colonies which m«*^ 
freely permitted waiver of jury trial as a matter of rou!,<* 
were Massachusetts and Maryland. The "first consti*-* 
tion" of Massachusetts—The Body of Liberties of 164: 
contained as Liberty XXIX the following: 
"Tn all actions at law, it shall be Hie liberty of the 
SINGER v. UNITED STATES. 29 
24 Opinion of the Court. 
whether they will be tried by the Bench or by a Jury, 
unless it be where the law upon just reason has other-
wise determined. The like liberty shall be granted 
to all persons in Criminal cases." 
It should be noted that Liberty XXIX's language ex-
plicitly provided that the right to choose trial by judge 
alone was subject to change "where the law upon just 
reason has otherwise determined." Moreover, those draft-
ing and administering the Liberty recognized that it was 
a departure from the English common law. Grinnell, To 
What Extent is the Right to Jury Trial Optional in Crim-
inal Cases in Massachusetts? 8 Mass. L. Q. No. 5, 7, 23-25 
(1923). Several cases can be cited, at least up until 
1692, in which defendants in Massachusetts waived jury 
trial and were tried by the bench. See Grinnell, supra, 
at 27-29; Griswold, supra, at 661-664. However, from 
1692 on, in light of increasing hostility to the Crown, 
the colonists of Massachusetts stressed their right to trial 
by jury, not their right to choose between alternate 
methods of trial. Instead of being a settled part of the 
jurisprudence of Massachusetts at the time of the Con-
stitutional Convention, the ability to choose between 
judge and jury had become a forgotten option in 
Massachusetts: 
"With the state of mind then existing among the 
colonists, presumably nobody bothered about this 
question of any one's wanting to waive a jury. The 
General Court was then concerned with the question 
of a man's right to a jury when he asked for it, which 
they thought in danger. The 'Body of Liberties' 
never having been printed and the nineteen original 
official manuscript copies having doubtless been lost 
or forgotten, the 'bar' (which did not begin to de-
velop until the beginning of the 18th century) and 
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 r= ^aDiy grew up without 
any general knowledge of the expressly optional 
character of the right to .'i jury established as a 
'fundamental* by the COIMIU-* Nw of Massachusetts 
i * •• colonial period.5' ' 
II appiat:- nun iron n<- -;u * -uy> : .siar\ iaiui's 
colonization minor eases were hied by judges sitting 
alone. Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal 
Cases by Judges Alone, Without Juries, 11 A. B. A. J. 
699, 700 (1925). But the "defendant who submitted his 
case to the judge was not considered on a par with the 
defendant who chose to have a jury hear his case, as is 
evidenced by a Maryland statute of 1793 which provided 
that submission to a judge would be considered an admis-
sion of crime (analogous to the "implied confession" of 
minor offenses under English common law) at least inso-
far as to render the person submitting his case to a judge 
liable for the costs of prosecution. In 1809, Maryland 
declared by statute that waiver of jury trial was to be 
encouraged and the willing defendant was to suffer no 
increased liability for so doing. It was not until 1823, 





 \ lone, and the first major case so submitted caused 
some surprise and sharp 'Comment in Maryland legal 
circles. See Bond, supra, at 701, 
Other possible examples of optional ji iry trial pro 
cedures can be cited in colonial New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Connecticut, New Jersey and Pennsylvania,6 See Gris-
4
 Grinnell, supra, at 33. 
5
 The Pennsylvania case of Proprietor v. WUkins, Pennypacker's 
Pennsylvania Colonial Cases 88 (1892), decided in 1685-1686, is of 
interest in that the court tried a fornication case without a jury 
over the objection of the prosecution. The punisliment involved in 
the case was a 10-pound fine. The case is, therefore, little author-
ity for the proposition that defendants had* the right to waive jury 
trials in all cases. 
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wold, supra, at 664-667. The most that can be said for 
these examples is that they are evidence that the colonists 
believed it was possible to try criminal defendants with-
out a jury. They in no way show that there was any 
general recognition of a defendant's right to be tried by 
the court instead of by a jury. Indeed, if there had been 
recognition of such a right, it would be difficult to under-
stand why Article III and the Sixth Amendment were 
not drafted in terms which recognized an option. 
The Constitution and Its Judicial Interpretation. The 
proceedings at the Constitutional Convention give little 
insight into what was meant by the direction in Art. Il l , 
§ 2, that the "Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by jury." 
The clause was clearly intended to protect the accused 
from oppression by the Government, see III Farrand, Rec-
ords of the Federal Convention 101 (James Wilson), 221-
222 (Luther Martin) (1911); but, since the practice of 
permitting defendants a choice as to the mode of trial was 
not widespread, it is not surprising that some of the 
framers apparently believed that the Constitution desig-
nated trial by jury as the exclusive method of determining 
guilt, see The Federalist, No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Cooke ed. 1961); IV Elliot's Debates 145, 171 (James 
Iredell) (2d ed. 1876); III Elliot's Debates 521 (Edmund 
Pendleton) (2d ed. 1876). 
In no known federal criminal case in the period imme-
diately following the adoption of the Constitution did a 
defendant claim that he had the right to insist upon a 
trial without a jury. Indeed, in United States v. Gibert, 
25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (No. 15204) (C. C. D. Mass. 1834), 
Mr. Justice Story, while sitting on circuit, indicated his 
view that the Constitution made trial by jury the only 
permissible method of trial. Similar views were expressed 
by other federal judges. See Ex parte McClusky, 40 F. 
71, 74-75 (C. C. D. Ark. 1889) (by implication); United 
UTAH STATE 
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States v. Taylor, ii i. *70, 471 (C. C. .U Kan. 1882) 
(diet urn).11 
Although not necessary to the holding in the case, in 
Thompson v. Utah, 170 IT. S. 343, this Court also .ex-
pressed a view that the Constitution made jury trial the 
exclusive method of determining guilt in all federal crim-
inal cases, lluvwvi'!. in Srhlrk TT,i>i. > State* M^ 
U. S. 65, the Court decided there was no institutional 
requirement that petty offenses be tried by jury. These 
two decisions were construed by the lower federal courts 
as establishing a n lie that in all but petty offenses jury 
trial was a constitutional imperative. See Coates v. 
United States, 290 F. 134 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1923); Blair 
v. United States, 241 F. 217, 230 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1917); 
Frank \ , United States, 192 F. 864, 867-868 (C. A nth 
6
 In construing their own constitutions, which generally had clauses 
designed to preserve the common-law right to trial by jury, the state 
courts took a similarly limited view of the ability of a defendant to 
waive jury trial. Some state courts ruled that in the absence of a 
statute there could be no waiver of jury trial. See, e. g., Wilson v. 
State, 16 Ark. 601 (1855); State v. Maine, 27 Conn, 281 (1858); 
People v. Smith, 9 Mich. 193 (1861). Several other courts deter-
mined that the State could by statute prohibit waiver of jury trials. 
See, e. g., Arnold v. Nebraska, 38 Neb. 752, 57 N. W. 378 (1894); 
In re McQuown, 19 Okla. 347, 91 P. 689 (1907); State v. Batten, 
32 R. I. 475, 80 A. 10 (1911); State v. Hirsch, 91 Vt. 330, 100 A. 
877 (1917); Mays v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 550 (1886). Some 
state courts interpreted their constitutions to say that under no 
circumstances could waiver be allowed. See, e. g.} State v. Holt, 
90 N. C. 749 (1884); Williams v. State, 12 Ohio St. 622 (1861). 
Several courts, of course, held that waiver of a jury was permissible, 
even in the absence of enabling legislation. See, e. g., State ex rel. 
Warner v. Baer, 103 Ohio St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (1921) (over-
ruling Williams v. Statet supra); Ex parte King, 42 Okla. Cr. 46, 
274 P. 682 (Okla. Grim. App. 1929). In Hailinger v. Davis, 146 
U. S. 314, this Court held that a state statute permitting waiver 
of jury trial in criminal cases did not violate the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Cir. 1911) (dictum); Low v. United States, 169 F. 86 
(C. A. 6th Cir. 1909); Dickinson v. United States, 159 
F. 801 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1908), cert, denied, 213 U. S. 92. 
The issue whether a defendant could waive a jury trial 
in federal criminal cases was finally presented to this 
Court in Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276. The 
Patton case came before the Court on a certified question 
from the Eighth Circuit. The wording of the question, 
id., at 287, is significant: 
"After the commencement of a trial in a Federal 
Court before a jury of twelve men upon an indict-
ment charging a crime, punishment for which may 
involve a penitentiary sentence, if one juror becomes 
incapacitated and unable to further proceed with his 
work as a juror, can defendant or defendants and the 
Government through its official representative in 
charge of the case consent to the trial proceeding to 
a finality with eleven jurors, and can defendant or 
defendants thus waive the right to a trial and verdict 
by a constitutional jury of twelve men?" 
The question explicitly stated that the Government had 
agreed with the defendant that his trial should proceed 
with 11 jurors. The case did not involve trial before a 
judge alone, but the Court believed that trial before 11 
jurors was as foreign to the common law as was trial 
before a judge alone, and therefore both forms of waiver 
"in substance amount[ed] to the same thing." Id., at 
290. The Court examined Art. Il l , § 2, and the Sixth 
Amendment and concluded that a jury trial was a right 
which the accused might "forego at his election." Id., 
at 298. The Court also spoke of jury trial as a "privi-
lege," not an "imperative requirement," ibid., and re-
marked that jury trial was principally for the benefit of 
the accused, id., at 312. Nevertheless, the Court was 
conscious of the precise question that was presented by 
the Eighth Circuit, and concluded its opinion, id., at 312-
("TOHKU TKRl\ "' I 
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"1o w'\u arefully chosen langu^e tl.a\ dispelled any 
1
 - hat the defendant had an absolute right to demand 
** ;ore a judge silting alone: 
Not i>nly must the right of tue 'u a trial 
by a constitutional jury be jealous -. -erved, but 
the maintennnee of [he jury ;i> a • i« . finding body 
• .•nal cases is of such importance and has such 
; e in our traditions, that, before any waiver can 
me effective, the consent of government counsel 
arw the sanctum of the court must be had, in addi-
fhe "\nress and intelligent consent of the 
1
 An*I the duty of the trial court in that 
not to be discharged as a mere matter of 
rote, *>nt with sound and advised discretion, with an 
*•' • •- avoid unreasonable or undue departures from 
Lii;,i mode of trial or from any of the essential ele-
ments thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree 
as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity." 
In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCani i, 317 U. S. 
269, 277-278, this Court reaffirmed the position taken in 
Patton that "one charged with a serious federal crime 
may dispense with his Constitutional right to jury trial, 
where this action i> take i with I1..- express, intelligent 
consent, where the * Government also consents, and where 
such action is npp*'^'«"i ?- i]v * w vn i^U id^nuM < of 
the trial court. 
II 
Thus, there is no federally recognized right to a criminal 
trial before a judge sitting alone, but a defendant can, 
as was held in Patton, in some instances waive his right 
to a trial by jury. The question ra nains whether the 
effectiveness of this waiver can be eonditici.'-d upon the 
consent of the prosecuting attorney :md the (rial judge. 
The ability to waive a constitutional ri^ht does not 
ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the oppo-
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site of that right. For example, although a defendant can, 
under some circumstances, waive his constitutional right 
to a public trial, he has no absolute right to compel a pri-
vate trial, see United States v. Kobli, 172 F. 2d 919, 924 
(C. A. 3d Cir. 1949) (by implication); although he can 
waive his right to be tried in the State and district where 
the crime was committed, he cannot in all cases compel 
transfer of the case to another district, see Piatt v. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U. S. 240, 245; Kersten v. 
United States, 161 F. 2d 337, 339 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1947), 
cert, denied, 331 U. S. 851; and although he can waive his 
right to be confronted by the witnesses against him, it 
has never been seriously suggested that he can thereby 
compel the Government to try the case by stipulation. 
Moreover, it has long been accepted that the waiver of 
constitutional rights can be subjected to reasonable pro-
cedural regulations: Rule 7 (b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure sets forth the procedure to be fol-
lowed for waiver of the right to be prosecuted by indict-
ment; Rule 20 describes the procedure for waiver of the 
right to be tried in the district in which an indictment or 
information is pending against a defendant; and Rule 44 
deals with the waiver of the right to counsel. 
Trial by jury has been established by the Constitution 
as the "normal and . . . preferable mode of disposing of 
issues of fact in criminal cases." Patton v. United States, 
281 U. S. 276, 312. As with any mode that might be 
devised to determine guilt, trial by jury has its weak-
nesses and the potential for misuse. However, the mode 
itself has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as 
fair as possible—for example, venue can be changed when 
there is a well-grounded fear of jury prejudice, Rule 
21 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
prospective jurors are subject to voir dire examination, 
to challenge for cause, and to peremptory challenge, Rule 
24(a) and (b). 
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In light of the Constitution's emphasis on jury trial, 
we find it difficult to understand how the petitioner can 
submit the bald proposition that to compel a defendant 
in a criminal case to undergo a jury trial against his will 
is contrary to his right to a fair trial or to due process. 
A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the 
method of trial is to an impartial trial by jury. We 
find no constitutional impediment to conditioning a 
waiver of this right on the consent of the prosecuting 
attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to con-
sent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to 
an impartial trial by jury—the very thing that the Consti-
tution guarantees him. The Constitution recognizes an 
adversary system as the proper method of determining* 
guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate 
interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a convic-
tion is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the 
Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair re-
sult. This recognition of the Government's interest as a 
litigant has an analogy in Rule 24 (b) of the federal 
rules, which permits the Government to challenge jurors 
peremptorily. 
We are aware that the States have adopted a variety of 
procedures relating to the waiver of jury trials in state 
criminal cases. Some have made waiver contingent on 
approval by the prosecutor, e. g., California (Cal. Const. 
Art. I, § 7), Indiana (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1803 (1956 Repl. 
vol.), Alldredge v. Indiana, 239 Ind. 256, 156 N. E. 2d 
888 (1959)), and Virginia (Va. Const. § 8, Va. Code Ann. 
§ 19.1-192 (1950 Repl. vol.), Booze v. Commonwealth, 
165 Va. 786, 183 S. E. 263 (1936)). Others, while not 
giving the prosecutor a voice, have made court approval 
a prerequisite for waiver, e. g., Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 102-106 (1955), Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 25 S. E. 
2d 295 (1943)), and Washington (Wash. Rev. Code 
§10.01.060 (1963 Supp.)). Still others have provided 
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that the question of waiver is a matter solely for the 
defendant's informed decision, 6. g., Connecticut (Conn. 
Gen. Stat, Rev. §54-82 (1958)), and Illinois (111. Ann. 
Stat. c. 38, § 103-6 (Smith-Hurd ed. 1964), Illinois v. 
Spegal, 5 111. 2d 211, 125 N. E. 2d 468 (1955)). How-
ever, the framers of the federal rules were aware of pos-
sible alternatives when they recommended the present 
rule to this Court, see Orfield, Trial by Jury in Federal 
Criminal Procedure, 1962 Duke L. J. 29, 69-72; this 
Court promulgated the rule as recommended; and Con-
gress can be deemed to have adopted it, 18 U. S. C. § 3771 
(1958 ed.). 
In upholding the validity of Rule 23 (a), we reiterate 
the sentiment expressed in Berger v. United States, 295 
U. S. 78, 88, that the government attorney in a criminal 
prosecution is not an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
a "servant of the law" with a "twofold aim . . . that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." It was in light 
of this concept of the role of prosecutor that Rule 23 (a) 
was framed, and we are confident that it is in this light 
that it will continue to be invoked by government attor-
neys. Because of this confidence in the integrity of the 
federal prosecutor, Rule 23 (a) does not require that the 
Government articulate its reasons for demanding a jury 
trial at the time it refuses to consent to a defendant's 
proffered waiver. Nor should we assume that federal 
prosecutors would demand a jury trial for an ignoble pur-
pose. We need not determine in this case whether there 
might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons 
for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling 
that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would 
result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. 
Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where 
"passion, prejudice . . . public feeling" 7 or some other 
7
 Petitioner's Brief, p. 24. 
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factor may render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial 
by jury. However, since petitioner gave no reason for 
wanting to forgo jury trial other than to save time, 
this is not such a case, and petitioner does not claim that 
it is. 
Petitioner has also raised questions involving the in-
structions to the jury and alleged misconduct by the 
prosecuting attorney. We have examined the record and 
find that the jury was adequately instructed. In any 
event, no timely objection was made as required by Rule 
30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and, in 
the absence of plain error, the Court of Appeals correctly 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Similarly with-
out merit are petitioner's specifications of misconduct by 
the prosecuting attorney during the trial, since the record 
reveals that the misconduct, if any, was neither purpose-
ful nor flagrant, and the trial court's admonitions to the 
jury seem to have been well designed to cure whatever 
prejudicial impact some of the prosecutor's remarks may 
have had in this case. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
TabE 
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High court will decide judge 
v. jury in lunch lady sex case 
Court» Justices' 
decision could take 
eight to 12 months. 
By STEPHEN HUNT 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
The Utah Supreme Court 
has agreed to decide if a mid-
dle-school cafeteria work-
er accused of having sex with 
a 16-year-old boy can have a 
judge, rather than a jury, weigh 
the evidence against her. 
Jamie Lynn Greenwood, 41, 
is charged with felony counts 
of rape, forcible sodomy and 
forcible sexual abuse. 
Greenwood was set to go to 
trial by jury in August when 
she and her attorney asked 3rd 
District Judge Robert Adkins 
to hear the case instead. 
Prosecutors objected, noting 
that a Utah court rule requires 
all felony cases to be tried 
by a jury unless the prosecu-
tion consents to a bench trial 
and the judge approves the 
change. Prosecutors also cited 
three cases in which the Utah 
Supreme Court determined a 
defendant has no constitution-
al right to a bench trial. 
But Adkins granted the de-
fense's request, citing a U.S. Su-
preme Court case that appears 
to make an exception to the 
general rule under "some cir-
cumstances/' 
In a written ruling, Adkins 
wrote that "the cumulative 
impact'' of several factors had 
created just such "an unusu-
al circumstance" as was envi-
sioned by the high court. The 
judge noted "the nature of the 
case, the publicity this case has 
received, and the fine line be-
tween the offenses charged 
and lesser included offenses 
which the court had agreed to 
consider." 
The judge was informed 
this week that the high court 
had agreed to decide the issue, 
and that the process would 
take eight to 12 months. 
Adkins set a review hear-
ing for March 8. Meanwhile, 
Greenwood is free on $10,000 
bail in conjunction with super-
vision by Pretrial Services. 
Greenwood, who was a caf-
eteria supervisor employed at 
Eastmont Middle School in 
Sandy since 2006, resigned in 
March. 
During an April prelimi-
nary hearing, the alleged vic-
tim — who was a friend and 
classmate of Greenwood's son 
— testified he was 14 years old 
when Greenwood befriended 
him. Over the next two years, 
he said, Greenwood bought 
him gifts and then demand-
ed sexual favors as repayment. 
The boy testified he want-
ed the relationship to stop but 
that Greenwood threatened 
to tell his mother and people 
at school if it ended. 
shunt@sHrib.com 
